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INTRODUCTION 
On April 27, 2011, the Supreme Court announced its decision in 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,1 one of the most closely watched 
cases of the 2010 Term.  In Concepcion, the Court considered whether 
states may condition the enforceability of arbitration agreements on 
the availability of class-wide arbitration proceedings.2  While the sub-
ject of class arbitration is rarely viewed as a headline-grabbing legal 
topic, Concepcion attracted the attention of many consumer advocates, 
corporate counsel, and procedural scholars because of its far-reaching 
implications for consumer and employment contracts and class action 
policy.3  Ultimately, the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) preempts states from invalidating class action waivers in arbitra-
tion agreements because these invalidations stand as an obstacle to 
the purposes behind the FAA.4 
Was this result surprising?  Not in the least.  Indeed, given the in-
creasingly predictable road the Court had taken in previous FAA cas-
es,5 a contrary ruling exhibiting deference to a state’s views on arbitra-
tion would have represented an abrupt tug on the FAA steering wheel.  
But leaving the Court’s track record aside, was the Court’s decision to 
limit the role of states in shaping class action policy a legally sound 
and principled conclusion?  In this Comment, I argue that it was not.  
Because class actions are so intimately linked to the vindication of 
substantive rights, the Court should not have unilaterally made a poli-
cy decision as to when the use of class proceedings is appropriate. 
Though class action policy discussions typically focus on the effi-
cacy of class action litigation6 or the inner workings of Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,7 Concepcion did not directly involve 
 
1 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
2 Id. at 1744. 
3 See generally AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog. 
com/case-files/cases/att-mobility-v-concepcion (last visited Nov. 15, 2011) (listing amicus 
briefs from consumer advocacy associations, trade associations, and dispute resolution 
professors). 
4 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
5 See infra Section I.B. 
6 See infra note 189. 
7 Rule 23 provides procedural rules for class action suits.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.   For 
the Court’s most recent discussion of Rule 23, see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. 
Ct. 2541, 2548-61 (2011).    
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either of these topics.  Instead, Concepcion centered on the class ac-
tion’s close cousin, class arbitration8—proceedings involving similarly 
situated litigants that occur before an arbitrator, rather than before a 
judge or jury in court.  While the development of class arbitration was 
still in its embryonic stages, several judges and businesses adopted the 
view that this method of dispute resolution was antithetical to the 
whole point of arbitrating in the first place,9 which is to provide a 
speedy and efficient alternative to litigation.10  Eventually, with the ad-
dition of more claimants and in light of the uncertainty surrounding 
this new form of aggregate procedure, class arbitration became what 
was described as “a lose-lose proposition” to which “no rational busi-
ness [would] agree.”11 
As a solution, defendant businesses turned to their contracts for 
protection.  By inserting class action waivers into their arbitration 
agreements—agreements that were themselves part of larger contracts 
with consumers, employees, and other actors in the marketplace—
businesses attempted to narrowly circumscribe the procedures avail-
able to their adversaries.12  In essence, once an opposing party agreed 
to arbitrate any future claims and also to waive his right to bring pro-
ceedings as a class, the only remaining option was bilateral arbitration:  
arbitration between two individual parties. 
It was only matter of time before this solution was attacked in 
court.  In particular, consumers pleaded that class action waivers were 
exculpatory provisions in the small claims setting because the inclu-
sion of these waivers in arbitration agreements effectively relieved 
 
8 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.  
9 See, e.g., Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1215 (Cal. 1982) (Richardson, 
J., concurring and dissenting) (“[C]lass procedures would tend to make arbitration 
inefficient instead of efficient, lengthy instead of expeditious, and procedural instead 
of informal.”), rev’d sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
10 See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (describing one 
of the FAA’s goals as the “encouragement of efficient and speedy dispute resolution”).   
11 Brief for Petitioner at 22, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 
3017755, at *22. 
12 See Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) 
Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 437 (2010) (“[The] received 
wisdom [is] that some businesses’ use of consumer arbitration clauses is motivated, at 
least in part, by a desire to reduce their exposure to class actions.”); Myriam Gilles, Opt-
ing Out of Liability:  The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 373, 396 (2005) (“In the late 1990s, trade-journal articles first appeared 
encouraging corporate counsel to consider redrafting contracts to include provisions 
requiring consumers and others to waive the right to participate in class actions or 
even group arbitrations.”).  
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businesses from liability.13  Without class proceedings, no individual 
consumer in the small claims setting had an incentive to file a claim.14  
In some states, such arguments were initially met with favorable res-
ponses.  For example, an early opinion on the matter in California 
held that such class action waivers supplied defendants with a “‘get out 
of jail free’ card.”15  These waivers were also considered troublesome 
because they were almost always found in contracts of adhesion, or on 
a “take it or leave it” basis.16 
But the businesses in these suits were not without a strong defense.  
Virtually all of the arbitration agreements in dispute were governed by 
the FAA,17 a federal statute that the Supreme Court has consistently 
held to proclaim a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments.”18  Thus, the common argument defendants raised in motions to 
compel arbitration was that the FAA required courts to enforce the ar-
bitration agreements, and with them, the class action waivers.19  Under 
this theory, the FAA, by way of the Supremacy Clause, would preempt 
state rules relating to arbitration.  On this point, however, state and cir-
cuit courts divided.  For example, some states and circuits ruled that the 
class action waiver was enforceable on its face or that the FAA 
preempted state policies to the contrary.20  But other decisions—
including the California Supreme Court’s leading opinion in Discover 
 
13 See, e.g., Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1006 (Wash. 2007) (examin-
ing whether a class action waiver in a cell phone contract’s arbitration agreement “ef-
fectively exculpat[ed] its drafter from liability for a large class of wrongful conduct”); 
Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 99-100 (N.J. 2006) 
(engaging in a similar inquiry in the context of a consumer loan contract). 
14 See Scott, 161 P.3d at 1007 (noting that Washington customers had brought no 
individual claims against the cell phone provider over a six-year period). 
15 Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal Rptr. 2d 862, 868 (Ct. App. 2002). 
16 Id. at 867. 
17 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).  The Act provides that “an agreement in writing to sub-
mit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of . . . a contract, transaction, or 
refusal [involving commerce], shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  Id. § 2. 
18 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (quoting Moses 
H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (quoting same). 
19 See, e.g., Scott, 161 P.3d at 1008 (introducing the defendant’s argument that its 
cell phone contract was covered by the FAA). 
20 See, e.g., Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 558-59 (7th Cir. 2003) (en-
forcing a waiver based on its explicit language); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n N.D., 
693 N.W.2d 918, 927 (N.D. 2005) (same); see also Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular 
Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 176 (5th Cir. 2004) (reversing a district court’s conclusion 
that an arbitration agreement was unconscionable and compelling arbitration pur-
suant to the FAA). 
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Bank v. Superior Court—held that § 2 of the FAA, known as the savings 
clause, enabled states to strike down class action waivers in the small 
claims setting on unconscionability grounds.21  Further complicating 
the analysis in some cases were additional clauses that ostensibly altered 
the cost equation for litigants, such as clauses providing for the reim-
bursement of arbitration costs or the payment of attorneys’ fees.22 
Concepcion took the Discover Bank rule head on, with the majority 
ultimately siding in favor of preemption.23  In doing so, the Court li-
mited states’ latitude to strike down class action waivers and effectively 
forced upon the states its own views regarding the pros and cons of 
certain aggregation policies (i.e., policies relating to the aggregation 
of claimants in a class action or collective action).  It is here, I will ar-
gue, that the Court erred.  Aggregation policies should not be a topic 
solely for our nation’s highest court.  As several commentators have 
recently argued, the availability of class proceedings is often deeply 
rooted in substantive regulatory policies, including state policies on 
the resolution of consumer disputes.24  In light of this inseparable 
connection to substantive law, it should be the state’s prerogative to 
determine whether the availability of class proceedings in arbitration 
would help further its substantive policies.  In support of this argu-
ment, I will highlight the inconsistencies within the Concepcion opinion, 
as well as the doctrinal confusion between the Court’s treatment of 
one aggregation mechanism, class arbitration, in Concepcion and the 
treatment of another aggregation mechanism, the class action, in a 
 
21 See, e.g., 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005) (finding that “under some circums-
tances . . . class action waivers in consumer contracts of adhesion are unenforceable” 
and that the FAA did not preempt California law on this issue), abrogated by AT&T Mo-
bility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); see also Shroyer v. New Cingular Wire-
less Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 988-93 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that an arbitration 
agreement was unconscionable under state law and thus not preempted by the FAA); 
Scott, 161 P.3d at 1009 (same). 
22 See, e.g., Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 (describing the cost-shifting provisions in 
AT&T’s arbitration agreement). 
23 Id. at 1753. 
24 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Op-
portunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 21 (2010) (arguing that Rule 23 does 
not set aggregation policy, but rather is “merely the mechanism for carrying an aggre-
gate proceeding into effect when the underlying law supports that result”); cf. David 
Marcus, Flawed but Noble:  Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class 
Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 716 (2011) (suggesting that the authors of Rule 23(b)(2) 
considered class treatment as “essential to the vindication of substantive rights”). 
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recent Rules Enabling Act challenge, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, 
P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.25 
In Part I of this Comment, I will analyze both the history of the 
FAA and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of this statute in relation 
to class arbitration.  Part II will briefly discuss lower courts’ use of un-
conscionability as a bulwark against class action waivers, while Part III 
will analyze the Concepcion case itself.  Part IV will juxtapose the FAA 
decisions with Shady Grove.  In Part V, I will examine several questions 
that remain unanswered after Concepcion and discuss avenues for 
reform.  These avenues include a potential amendment to the FAA, 
administrative regulations that could target class action waivers, and 
most importantly, a change in the way the Court approaches class ac-
tions in future cases, which should involve a greater appreciation for 
the role class actions play in the enforcement of substantive law. 
I.  A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
The question of whether states may mandate that class proceed-
ings be available in arbitration, notwithstanding an express contrac-
tual agreement to the contrary, ultimately turns on courts’ interpreta-
tion of the FAA.  Over the years, the Supreme Court has interpreted 
the FAA broadly and has in turn exhibited a considerable amount of 
deference to the black-and-white terms of the arbitration agreements 
at issue.26  But much of the FAA jurisprudence is constructed upon a 
foundation of assumptions about the intent of the FAA’s framers—
assumptions that are still being questioned today.  This Part will briefly 
analyze the history and text of the FAA and describe the FAA case law 
leading up to Concepcion. 
A.  The Text and History of the FAA 
The key language of the FAA appears in § 2, which states in perti-
nent part that agreements to arbitrate “shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
 
25 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (plurality opinion).  The Court in Shady Grove held that 
Rule 23 superseded a New York state law that prohibited certain class actions.  Id. at 
1437-38. 
26 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game:  Strategic Judging and the 
Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1422 (2008) (noting that the 
Court “has interpreted the FAA expansively, nullifying most of the state laws and pub-
lic policies that formerly excluded many types of transactions, such as consumer and 
employment transactions, from arbitration”). 
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the revocation of any contract.”27  This latter clause, which provides 
courts with room to invalidate arbitration agreements on generally 
applicable contract defenses, is commonly referred to as the FAA’s 
“savings clause.”28 
An idea that has persisted throughout the FAA line of cases is that 
Congress enacted this language in 1925 in response to hostility from 
the state courts toward the use of arbitration.29  The thought goes that 
the Act endeavored to put arbitration agreements on an “equal foot-
ing with other contracts.”30  In Concepcion, both the majority opinion 
and Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion subscribe to this view, albeit to 
varying degrees.  Justice Scalia’s majority opinion takes a more expan-
sive view, suggesting that the FAA’s goal of achieving streamlined pro-
ceedings is of roughly equal importance to the FAA’s corresponding 
goal of enforcing private agreements to arbitrate.31  Justice Breyer, on 
the other hand, cautions against viewing the efficiency objective as a 
primary goal of the statute.32  Moreover, Justice Breyer submits that 
when Congress enacted the FAA in 1925, the statute’s scope was in-
tended to cover agreements between merchants possessing “roughly 
equivalent bargaining power.”33 Scalia explicitly rejects this point, 
proposing that “[s]uch a limitation appears nowhere in the text” and 
that recent cases involving unequal bargaining partners have declined 
to apply the statute in this manner.34 
While Justice Breyer leaves much to be desired in his explanation 
of the FAA’s legislative history,35 his account more closely aligns with 
scholarly research on the issue.  For example, in a detailed historical 
 
27 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
28 Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 990 n.8 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
29 See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-71 (1995) (ex-
plaining that “American courts initially followed [the] English practice . . . [of] prohi-
biting arbitration clause enforcement” and that Congress “was ‘motivated, first and 
foremost, by a . . . desire’ to change this antiarbitration rule” (fourth alteration in orig-
inal) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985))). 
30 Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010).  
31 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2010) (describing 
the dissent’s view that the expeditious resolution of claims is not the overriding goal of 
the FAA as “greatly misleading”). 
32 Id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
33 Id. at 1759. 
34 Id. at 1749 n.5 (majority opinion) (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991)). 
35 Justice Breyer cites several congressional reports but gives little explanation as 
to how such reports reflect his account of congressional intent regarding the scope of 
the FAA.  Id. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
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account of the statute, Paul Carrington and Paul Haagen write that 
the FAA was “not necessarily the product of hostility to arbitration.”36  
Rather, the movement behind the passage of the FAA centered mostly 
on promoting interstate commerce and “mak[ing] the benefits of ar-
bitration generally available to the business world.”37  To be sure, it is 
likely that at least some state judges were miffed by the idea of having 
their cases pulled from their dockets because of a binding arbitration 
clause, and that by passing the FAA, Congress could ensure that these 
judges would refrain from acting territorially.38  But hostility, accord-
ing to Carrington and Haagen, was not the main concern.  In fact, al-
though state courts and legislatures were worried that binding arbitra-
tion clauses could become a “trap for the unwary” and could be used 
“as a potential means of economic oppression,”39 many courts favored 
arbitration as a general matter.40 
Moreover, Carrington and Haagen suggest that Congress in-
tended the FAA to apply to sophisticated businesses and not to stifle 
Progressive-era concerns for the weak and vulnerable.41  Indeed, the 
FAA excluded employment contracts of certain transportation work-
ers from its scope.42  While the FAA’s true purpose may prove to be 
evasive, legislators are currently attempting to resolve the debate.  As 
Part V will discuss in more detail, congressional lawmakers, acting in 
response to the Court’s ruling in Concepcion, have introduced a bill—
the Arbitration Fairness Act of 201143—that would amend the FAA.  
Among the bill’s findings is a provision stating that the FAA “was in-
tended to apply to disputes between commercial entities of generally 
similar sophistication and bargaining power.”44  Certainly, Concepcion’s 
supporters will likely view this statement as a blatant example of revi-
sionist history.  But at a minimum, this statement, along with research 
 
36 Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. 
REV. 331, 339.  
37 Id. at 341 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fa-
brics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1959)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
38 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that some courts 
“refus[ed] to order specific performance of agreements to arbitrate”). 
39 Carrington & Haagen, supra note 36, at 340, 343. 
40 See id. at 339 (explaining that “arbitration was widely favored in America”); see 
also IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 19 (1992) (“[C]ontrary to modern 
folklore . . . the premodern statutory law of arbitration was largely supportive of that 
institution, as was the common law.”). 
41 Carrington & Haagen, supra note 36, at 344.  
42 Bruhl, supra note 26, at 1431. 
43 S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011). 
44 Id. § 2(1). 
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such as Carrington and Haagen’s, demonstrates the considerable dis-
agreement over the majority opinion’s historical account of the FAA. 
Finally, one important feature of the historical period during 
which Congress enacted the FAA is that federal courts were still oper-
ating under the Swift v. Tyson regime, which applied general federal 
common law to the types of commercial contracts that included arbi-
tration provisions.45 It would be another thirteen years before the 
Court would require that state law be applied in federal-diversity con-
tract disputes.46  With this in mind, any attempt to recreate Congress’s 
intent with respect to the savings clause in diversity suits takes a bit of 
creativity.47  As I discuss below, much of the debate surrounding the 
savings clause focuses on how much latitude it affords the states in in-
validating arbitration agreements.  But given that Congress may have 
not had state contract law in mind at the time of enactment,48 a de-
termination of Congress’s intent regarding the statute’s deference to 
that law may be a Sisyphean task. 
B.  Case Law Interpreting the FAA 
In the decades since the FAA’s enactment, the Supreme Court has 
heard numerous challenges to its applicability.49  And in response to 
these challenges, the Court has ruled in favor of the party requesting 
 
45 41 U.S. 1, 19 (1842).  The Swift court held that the interpretation and effect of 
“contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature . . . are to be sought, not in 
the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general principles and doctrines of 
commercial jurisprudence.”  Id. at 19.  For a discussion of the expansion and eventual 
displacement of the Swift doctrine, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 550-64 (6th ed. 2009). 
46 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Except in matters go-
verned by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any 
case is the law of the State.”). 
47 Cf. Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1238 
(2011) (“[T]he language of the FAA is simply too indeterminate, and the congression-
al record leading to its enactment too sparse, to draw any firm conclusions about its 
original meaning.”). 
48 See Jack Wilson, “No-Class-Action Arbitration Clauses,” State-Law Unconscionability, 
and the Federal Arbitration Act:  A Case for Federal Judicial Restraint and Congressional Ac-
tion, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 737, 811 (2004) (“[T]he FAA was enacted in the shadow of 
Swift v. Tyson, meaning that the enacting Congress would not have expected federal 
courts to apply any state common law.”). 
49 Much of the FAA jurisprudence has focused on the arbitrability of particular 
statutory claims, see, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614 (1985), and the appropriate procedural interplay between the courts and the 
arbitrator, see, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).   
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arbitration virtually every time,50 displaying in some cases a Lochner -
esque approach to the freedom of contract.51  While an extended dis-
cussion of the FAA jurisprudence exceeds the scope of this Comment, 
this Section will discuss several early decisions that helped shape the 
Court’s reasoning in Concepcion, as well as the Court’s previous en-
counters with class arbitration in the FAA context. 
The modern Court’s policy toward the enforcement of arbitration 
clauses has its roots in two key decisions from the Burger Court.  In 
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., Justice 
Brennan set the standard for future FAA cases:  “Section 2 is a congres-
sional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural poli-
cies to the contrary.”52  A year later, in Southland Corp. v. Keating, a ma-
jority of the Court held that in creating a federal substantive law of ar-
bitrability, Congress intended for the FAA to apply not only in federal 
courts, but also in state courts.53  Furthermore, the Court explained 
that the policy from Moses H. Cone aimed to “foreclose state legislative 
attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”54  
Thus, when the Court applied this policy to a California statute that 
required judicial consideration of claims arising from a franchise 
agreement, it held that the FAA preempted the statute, notwithstand-
ing the fact that the appeal came from the California Supreme Court.55 
Yet the majority’s view that the FAA applies to state courts was met 
with considerable resistance, and ironically, the debate over Southland 
 
50 See Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, 
86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 1092 (2011) (“[T]he modern Court has never yet met 
an arbitration clause that it didn’t like.”). 
51 In Lochner v. New York, the Supreme Court held that a New York state law limit-
ing employment in bakeries to sixty hours a week and ten hours a day was “arbitrary 
interference” with the freedom to contract.  198 U.S. 45, 46, 63 (1905).  Justice 
Holmes, in his well-known dissent, criticized the Court’s promotion of economic due 
process, stating that “the 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s So-
cial Statics” (i.e., a nineteenth-century English work advocating laissez-faire philoso-
phies).  Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  But as Carrington and Haagen suggest, a 
variation of economic due process is reemerging via the FAA.  See Carrington & Haa-
gen, supra note 36, at 338 (“Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics, so long lost from constitu-
tional law, has been found by the Court to be alive and well and residing in the Federal 
Arbitration Act of 1925.” (footnote omitted)). 
52 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).   
53 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984).  Previously, in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manu-
facturing Co., this issue had been raised but left “up in the air.”  388 U.S. 395, 424 
(1967) (Black, J., dissenting). 
54 Southland, 465 U.S. at 16. 
55 Id. at 5, 16-17. 
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may still be affecting the Court’s modern-day certiorari decisions, such 
as its decision to hear Concepcion.  In Southland, Justice O’Connor 
penned a vigorous dissent, arguing that the legislative history of the 
FAA demonstrated Congress’s unambiguous intention for the statute 
to apply only in federal court.56  The academic literature on the history 
of the FAA tends to support her view.57  Her argument, moreover, has 
received subsequent support from conservative justices.  Justice Scalia 
has written that he “stand[s] ready to join four other Justices in overrul-
ing [Southland],”58 and Justice Thomas has subscribed to this view as re-
cently as 2008.59  If Concepcion had been an appeal from a state court, 
then it is uncertain whether the FAA would have applied at all, because 
the Court, particularly Justices Scalia and Thomas, might have felt ob-
liged to reconsider the majority’s view in Southland.60  But it is perhaps 
no coincidence that the Court consistently rejected certiorari petitions 
involving unconscionability rulings in state courts, and instead waited 
to grant certiorari to Concepcion, a Ninth Circuit case interpreting Cali-
fornia law.61  As one commentator has put it, the Court’s current certi-
orari process enables it to “wait for the right vehicles in which to make 
law,” and a federal case, like Concepcion, was an ideal vehicle through 
which the Court could advance its FAA agenda.62 
 
56 Id. at 25 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Justice O’Connor opined in Southland, 
“One rarely finds a legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA’s.  That history estab-
lishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as a procedural statute, ap-
plicable only in federal courts.”  Id.  
57 In a detailed account of the FAA’s history, Ian Macneil verifies O’Connor’s opi-
nion, writing that Southland “is an Orwellian object lesson in the potential and often 
actual unreliability of the legislative history of judges rationalizing results in cases.”  
MACNEIL, supra note 40, at 144; see also Carrington & Haagen, supra note 36, at 380 
(describing the majority’s opinion in Southland as “an extraordinarily disingenuous 
manipulation of the history of the 1925 Act”).   
58 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285 (1995) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). 
59 See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (listing 
his previous dissenting opinions in which he argues that the FAA does not apply to ar-
bitration clauses being analyzed in state courts). 
60 See Aaron Bruhl, AT&T v. Concepcion and Adherence to Minority Views, PRAWFS-
BLAWG (May 5, 2011, 1:50 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/05/ 
atts-long-game-on-arbitration.html (exploring a range of possible outcomes the Court 
might have reached regarding FAA preemption had Concepcion originated in state court). 
61 See Aaron Bruhl, AT&T’s Long Game on Unconscionability, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 5, 
2011, 9:40 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/05/atts-long-game-
on-unconscionability.html (“[C]ompanies trying to enforce the clauses filed plenty of 
petitions . . . asking the Supreme Court to slam the door on unconscionability challenges.  
They were all denied.”). 
62 Id. 
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Following Southland, the savings clause itself received much closer 
scrutiny.  In Perry v. Thomas, the Court again addressed the validity of a 
California statute that authorized judicial determinations “without re-
gard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate.”63  Given 
the holding in Southland, the Court had no reservations about 
preempting the state statute.64  Yet the Court’s dicta in Perry provided 
an important explanation of the savings clause, an explanation that 
would later factor prominently in the Court’s treatment of the Discover 
Bank rule in Concepcion.  In a footnote, the Perry Court emphasized 
that when litigants use traditional state law defenses to revoke a con-
tract, those principles—such as duress, fraud, or unconscionability—
must be applied uniformly to “any contract.”65  In other words, if a 
state court’s unconscionability doctrine is applied differently to arbi-
tration agreements than it is to other contracts, then the Supremacy 
Clause66 requires that the FAA preempt the state court’s attempt to re-
gulate the law of arbitrability. 
Although the subject of class arbitration made fleeting appearances 
in these early cases,67 the Court did not confront a question specifically 
involving class procedures in arbitration until 2003 in Green Tree Finan-
cial Corp. v. Bazzle.68  Unfortunately, the Bazzle ruling yielded no majority 
opinion and left several key questions unanswered.  In Bazzle, the de-
fendant argued that class arbitration was impermissible in a proceed-
ing that left it liable for over $20 million in statutory damages.69  Prior 
to the Court’s review, the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that 
class arbitration was permissible because the contracts were silent on 
that subject.70  On appeal, instead of deciding whether class arbitration 
could occur when contracts were silent, and rather than discussing the 
practical consequences of class arbitration, the Court simply ruled that 
 
63 482 U.S. 483, 484 (1987) (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West 1971)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
64 See id. at 491 (“[C]lear federal policy places § 2 of the Act in unmistakable con-
flict with California’s § 229 requirement that litigants be provided a judicial forum for 
resolving wage disputes.  Therefore, under the Supremacy Clause, the state statute must 
give way.”). 
65 Id. at 492 n.9 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)). 
66 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
67 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 9 & n.4 (1984) (highlighting the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court’s conclusion that imposing a class action structure on the arbitra-
tion was acceptable, but refusing to determine whether such a conclusion would be con-
trary to the FAA because the state supreme court had not reached this latter question). 
68 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
69 Id. at 449. 
70 Id. at 450.   
BLECHSCHMIDT FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2011  7:24 PM 
2012] All Alone in Arbitration 553 
the arbitrator, and not the court, should decide whether the parties in-
tended to permit class proceedings.71  Moreover, only a plurality of Jus-
tices joined the Bazzle holding,72 with four Justices dissenting73 and Jus-
tice Stevens concurring on alternate grounds.74 
During the 2009 Term, the Court finally took up the issue of class 
arbitration in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.75  Picking 
up where Bazzle left off, the Court took up the question of whether class 
arbitration can be imposed on parties when the “arbitration clause [is] 
‘silent’ on that issue.”76  Here, the Court decided it could not.77 
The arbitration agreement in Stolt-Nielsen was part of a contract, 
originally drafted in 1950, between several businesses and a group of 
shipping companies.78  The agreement said nothing about class pro-
ceedings.79  In the arbitration literature, scholars have referred to such 
an agreement as a “first-generation arbitration clause[]” because it in-
cluded neither a class action waiver (as would a “second-generation 
clause[]”) nor contractual provisions intended to make the arbitration 
agreement seem more consumer-friendly (as would a “third-generation 
clause[]”).80  Despite this silence, an arbitration panel in Stolt-Nielsen 
had previously decided that class proceedings in arbitration would be 
appropriate.81 
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the panel, holding 
that an arbitrator could decide “procedural questions which grow out 
of the dispute,” but that class arbitration was not such a question.82  In 
 
71 Id. at 452-53.  Bruhl has characterized this decision as an example of “the ulti-
mate trump card in the unconscionability game” because it allowed the Court both to 
avoid ruling on a difficult question of state contract law and to avoid creating a federal 
common law of contracts.  Bruhl, supra note 26, at 1470, 1475-77. 
72 539 U.S. at 447. 
73 Id. at 455 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
74 Id. at 454-56 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
75 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
76 Id. at 1764. 
77 Id. at 1776-77. 
78 Id. at 1764-65. 
79 Id. at 1766. 
80 Nagareda, supra note 50, at 1106.  
81 130 S. Ct. at 1766. 
82 Id. at 1775 (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 
(2002)).  It is uncertain whether Stolt-Nielsen overrules Bazzle.  The majority in Stolt-
Nielsen noted that Bazzle only retained a plurality, id. at 1771-72, and—while it might be 
a moot point after Concepcion—Stolt-Nielsen seems to open the door to future challenges 
regarding whether courts or arbitrators should determine the parties’ intent in allowing 
class arbitration.  See John Elwood, After Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.:  Deciding 
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Justice Alito’s majority opinion, the Court stressed that a “basic pre-
cept” of the FAA is that “arbitration ‘is a matter of consent, not coer-
cion.’”83  The Court then concluded that the arbitration agreement 
did not exhibit any explicit or implied intent by the parties to consent 
to class arbitration proceedings.84  On the issue of implied consent, 
the Court stated that “class-action arbitration changes the nature of 
arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties 
consented to it.”85  Additionally, the Court explained that class pro-
ceedings would invite several “fundamental changes” to the arbitra-
tion by adjudicating the rights of absent parties and transforming the 
dispute into a high-stakes showdown with limited judicial review.86 
As I will discuss in Part IV, this language from Stolt-Nielsen, which 
Concepcion subsequently adopted, is difficult to reconcile with other 
recent decisions involving aggregate proceedings.  But while Stolt-
Nielsen’s statements controlled agreements that were silent on class ar-
bitration, the holding did not address whether the doctrine of un-
conscionability could be used to invalidate class action waivers found 
in second- and third-generation arbitration agreements.  The next 
Part will discuss several of the unconscionability cases that were brew-
ing in the lower courts and that eventually prompted the Court to 
grant certiorari in Concepcion. 
II.  THE UNCONSCIONABILITY OF CLASS ACTION WAIVERS  
IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 
Although the Supreme Court had established in Southland and lat-
er cases that attempts by state legislatures to undercut the FAA would 
be preempted, plaintiffs seeking to avoid the enforcement of their ar-
bitration agreements still had a shield to use against defendants who 
moved to compel arbitration.  State courts were free to provide relief 
based on the explicit terms of the savings clause.  The savings clause 
permits courts to invalidate arbitration agreements on the basis of 
 
When Class Arbitration Is Permissible, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 27, 2010, 5:35 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2010/04/27/after-stolt-nielsen-v-animalfeeds-intl-corp-deciding- 
when-class-arbitration-is-permissible (noting that Stolt-Nielsen and Bazzle fail to resolve 
the question of whether the arbitrator or the court decides if an agreement permits 
class arbitration).   
83 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1773 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)). 
84 Id. at 1775. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 1776.  
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generally applicable contract defenses.87  Recognizing this fact, plain-
tiffs argued that class action waivers were unconscionable because their 
use in contracts of adhesion increased the chances that businesses 
would avoid liability for consumer fraud or employment discrimination 
in the small claims setting.88  Ultimately, state and circuit courts divided 
on the unconscionability issue, with the courts of up to twenty states 
constructing barriers against businesses’ use of these waivers.89 
A.  Unconscionability in the Lower Courts 
Unconscionability, a ground that “exist[s] at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract,”90 is a common law principle that dif-
fers from state to state.  As with any common law contract doctrine, it 
requires a fact-specific inquiry.  Therefore, the disparities among 
courts on the issue of class action waivers are not surprising.91  Never-
theless, almost all courts subscribe to several common principles of 
unconscionability.  For example, the defending party usually must 
prove both procedural and substantive unconscionability—with the 
procedural aspect relating to defects in the bargaining and the subs-
tantive aspect relating to harsh or one-sided terms.92  Also, courts of-
ten apply a sliding scale approach, meaning that the more procedural-
ly unconscionable a contractual provision is, the less substantively 
unconscionable it must be, and vice versa.93  In light of these common 
principles, as we will see, varying attitudes toward class actions, not dif-
fering approaches to unconscionability, best explain the disparate re-
sults across states and circuits. 
California pioneered the use of unconscionability to protect indi-
viduals from class action waivers.  One of the earliest invalidations of a 
 
87 See supra text accompanying notes 28 and 65. 
88 See supra note 13. 
89 Brief for Respondents at 1, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 
(2011) (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 4411292, at *1; see also id. app. at 1a-3a (listing the twenty 
states and corresponding decisions that have invalidated class action waivers). 
90 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).   
91 One reason courts have not applied the doctrine uniformly is that they have 
struggled to develop an exact definition for unconscionability.  One commentator has 
noted, “That the term is incapable of precise definition is a source of both strength and 
weakness.”  1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 581 (3d ed. 2004).  
Unconscionability, however, is commonly defined as “an absence of meaningful choice 
on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably 
favorable to the other party.”  Id. at 582 (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
92 Id. at 582-88. 
93 Id. at 585. 
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class action waiver occurred in Szetela v. Discover Bank.94  In Szetela, the 
California Court of Appeals found that the class action waiver at issue 
was procedurally unconscionable because it was offered on a “take it or 
leave it” basis.95  Furthermore, the Szetela court held that “[t]he manifest 
one-sidedness . . . [was] blindingly obvious” because the class action 
waiver would certainly not harm the defendant, Discover Bank.96  Not 
only was the provision unconscionable, but it was also against public 
policy because it granted Discover Bank “a ‘get out of jail free’ card 
while compromising important consumer rights.”97  In other words, the 
inclusion of the waiver undermined a consumer’s right to have his de-
ceptive business practices claim adjudicated.  Notably, the appeals court 
did not face an FAA preemption challenge in the case. 
Three years later, the California Supreme Court decided the se-
minal case on the issue of unconscionability and laid down the three-
part test that the Ninth Circuit subsequently used in Concepcion.  In 
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, the court held that, in at least some in-
stances, class action waivers are unconscionable.98  Specifically, the 
court acknowledged that “[c]lass action and arbitration waivers are 
not, in the abstract, exculpatory clauses,” that is clauses that would re-
lieve the defendants from liability.99  The Discover Bank court neverthe-
less concluded that, in practice, these waivers are “indisputably one-
sided.”100  The court then laid out its three-part test, holding that class 
action waivers are unconscionable under California law if (1) “the 
waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion”; (2) the setting 
“predictably involve[s] small damages”; and (3) “it is alleged that the 
party with superior bargaining power has [attempted] to deliberately 
cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of 
money.”101  Under these conditions, the Court reasoned, the agree-
 
94 118 Cal Rptr. 2d 862 (Ct. App. 2002). 
95 Id. at 867. 
96 Id.  
97 Id. at 868. 
98 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005).  The dispute in Discover Bank involved claims 
by credit cardholders who had been charged late fees.  Id. at 1103.  Although the card-
holders made payments on the specified day, they did not make them by a certain un-
specified time—a time which the credit card company used to assess fees.  Id.  
99 Id. at 1108. 
100 Id. at 1109. 
101 Id. at 1110.  The court explained that the waiver, by satisfying these three criteria, 
violated the state’s prohibition against “contract clauses that are contrary to public poli-
cy.”  Id. at 1108; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2009) (“All contracts which have for 
their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own 
fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether 
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ment violated the state’s statutory provisions against unconscionable 
and exculpatory contracts, noting additionally that “class actions and 
arbitrations are . . . inextricably linked to the vindication of substan-
tive rights.”102 
In Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court also reversed the 
appeals court’s conclusion that the FAA preempted California’s policy 
regarding class action waivers.103  The court explained that “the prin-
ciple that class action waivers are, under certain circumstances, un-
conscionable . . . does not specifically apply to arbitration agreements, 
but to contracts generally.”104  For support, the court cited its decision 
in America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court,105 which also found a class ac-
tion waiver unenforceable, though outside the arbitration context.106  
As noted earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court, in its explanation of the sav-
ings clause in Perry, warned against discriminatory applications of gen-
eral contract principles to arbitration agreements.107  But because the 
America Online case showed that California’s unconscionability test was 
not limited to the arbitration context, the admonition in Perry would 
presumably not apply.  Thus, under this interpretation, the uncons-
cionability test in Discover Bank would fall squarely into the acceptable 
parameters of the savings clause. 
Finally, the Discover Bank court commented on the use of class arbi-
tration.  Although class arbitration is not an optimal form of dispute 
resolution, the court said it “must be evaluated, not in relation to some 
ideal but in relation to its alternatives.”108  In other words, while class 
arbitration may have its flaws, if the alternative is to foreclose consumer 
rights, then courts must consider compelling class arbitration. 
Although several other state courts had invalidated similar class ac-
tion waivers before Discover Bank,109 many courts adopted the California 
 
willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.”).  California law also includes a sta-
tutory prohibition against unconscionable contracts.  See id. § 1670.5 (allowing courts to 
“limit the application of any unconscionable clause”). 
102 Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1109. 
103 Id. at 1110. 
104 Id. at 1112. 
105 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (Ct. App. 2001). 
106 Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1106-07, 1112. 
107 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.  
108 Id. at 1116 (quoting Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal. 1982), 
rev’d sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)). 
109 See, e.g., Leonard v. Terminix Int’l Co., 854 So. 2d 529, 538-39 (Ala. 2002) (in-
validating a class action waiver in a termite protection contract); State ex rel. Dunlap v. 
Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 282-84 (W. Va. 2002) (finding a class action waiver in an insur-
ance contract unenforceable). 
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Supreme Court’s reasoning after the ruling.110  Some state courts have 
gone to even greater lengths to show that they will find a class action 
waiver unconscionable only if it is indeed exculpatory.  For example, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated a class action waiver involv-
ing small claims on the same day it enforced a provision involving no 
small claims.111  This is not to say that state and federal courts have uni-
formly invalidated class action waivers, however.  Numerous states and 
circuits have enforced the waivers pursuant to the explicit terms of the 
arbitration agreement without regard to the size of the claim.112 
In addition to the decisions that view class action waivers “through 
the prism of state unconscionability law,”113 several circuit courts have 
utilized a somewhat different analysis, albeit one that produces essen-
tially the same result.  Rather than apply state contract law principles, 
these circuits have analyzed the friction between class action waivers 
and statutes that rely primarily on private enforcement and class ac-
tions to achieve public policy goals, such as the Sherman Act.114  While 
several circuits have found that class action waivers do not conflict 
with the statutory schemes at issue,115 both the First and Second Cir-
 
110 See, e.g., Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 984 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (applying Discover Bank’s three-part test to Cingular’s class arbitration waiver 
and finding it “both procedurally and substantively unconscionable”); Scott v. Cingular 
Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1006 (Wash. 2007) (finding that the “class action is often the 
only effective way to halt and redress . . . exploitation” of consumers by companies 
(quoting Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1105)). 
111 Compare Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 99-
101 (N.J. 2006) (invalidating the waiver at issue where each plaintiff’s claim was so 
small that it was unlikely that individuals would bring suit), with Delta Funding Corp. v. 
Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 115 (N.J. 2006) (upholding a waiver in a suit for over $100,000 in 
damages in which the plaintiff had “adequate incentive” to bring an individual suit). 
112 See supra note 20; see also, e.g., Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 
(3d Cir. 2000) (concluding that the right to bring a class action can be contractually 
waived); Stenzel v. Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133, 143-45 (Me. 2005) (enforcing a class action 
ban under Texas law and determining that the “one-sided aspects of the arbitration 
provision [do not] render it unconscionable”); Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 
735, 750-51 (Md. 2005) (upholding a class action ban under Maryland law and noting 
the “strong policy, made clear in both federal and Maryland law, that favors the en-
forcement of arbitration agreements”). 
113 Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 63 (1st Cir. 2006). 
114 See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 196-98 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(highlighting the importance of class actions for plaintiffs vindicating their rights un-
der antitrust statutes). 
115 See, e.g., Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 
2004) (enforcing a class action waiver in a dispute involving claims under the Fair La-
bor Standards Act and rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that the waiver “deprive[d] them 
of substantial rights guaranteed by [that Act]”); Snowden v. Checkpoint Check Cash-
ing, 290 F.3d 631, 638-39 (4th Cir. 2002) (enforcing a waiver in a dispute involving 
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cuits have invalidated class action waivers using a “statutory rights 
analysis.”116  Under this analysis, courts refuse to enforce class action 
waivers if the foreseeable result is plaintiffs’ inability to vindicate their 
statutory rights in arbitration.  For instance, in an antitrust suit, if class 
proceedings are not available, then a plaintiff’s claim could be cost-
prohibitive because of the great expense of hiring an economist as an 
expert witness.  On these facts, the Second Circuit declared a class ac-
tion waiver unenforceable.117  As Part V will explain, cases relying on a 
statutory rights analysis appear to survive the Concepcion decision. 
B.  Pre-Concepcion Commentary and the Procedure/Substance Divide 
Before the Court granted certiorari in Concepcion, courts striking 
down class action waivers had been the subject of critical reviews in 
the arbitration literature.118  Nevertheless, these early criticisms began 
to shed light on how courts were incorporating state aggregation poli-
cies—policies relating to the aggregation of claimants in a class action 
or collective action—into their rulings. 
Despite the California Supreme Court’s assertion that its rule 
against unconscionable class action waivers applied generally to all 
contracts and not just arbitration agreements, several commentators 
claim that the California courts were not actually practicing what they 
preached.  For example, Michael McGuinness and Adam Karr contend 
that the California courts were applying a “heightened standard of un-
conscionability in the arbitration context”119 and that they “ha[d] taken 
the FAA’s ‘savings clause’ where no court ha[d] gone before.”120  While 
 
Truth in Lending Act claims and finding “no limitations upon the substantive reme-
dies available to [the plaintiff] in arbitration”). 
116 See, e.g., In re Am. Express, 634 F.3d at 197-99 (invalidating a class action waiver 
as inconsistent with the Sherman and Clayton Acts because it “preclude[d] plaintiffs 
from enforcing their statutory rights”); Kristian, 446 F.3d at 59, 61 (invalidating a class 
action waiver on the basis that Comcast would be “essentially shielded from private 
consumer antitrust enforcement liability” if the agreement were upheld).   
117 See In re Am. Express, 634 F.3d at 197-98 (“[T]he cost of plaintiffs’ individually 
arbitrating their dispute with Amex would be prohibitive, effectively depriving plain-
tiffs of the statutory protections of the antitrust laws.”). 
118 See, e.g., Michael G. McGuinness & Adam J. Karr, California’s “Unique” Approach 
to Arbitration:  Why This Road Less Traveled Will Make All the Difference on the Issue of 
Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 61, 78 (arguing that Cali-
fornia courts were “accomplish[ing] what the FAA commands cannot be done . . . all 
under the guise of a ‘generally applicable contract defense’” (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., 
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996))). 
119 Id. at 81. 
120 Id. at 62. 
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the authors limited their analysis primarily to employment disputes, 
they concluded that the California courts were demonstrating an anti-
quated form of hostility toward arbitration agreements.121 
Such arguments may also have empirical support. Stephen 
Broome’s analysis of California Courts of Appeal cases from 1982 to 
2006 found that unconscionability challenges to provisions in arbitra-
tion agreements were about five times more successful than uncon-
scionability challenges in the nonarbitration context.122  He argues 
that during this time, the California courts strayed from their tradi-
tional “shock[s] the conscience” analysis.123 However, Professor Aaron-
Andrew Bruhl countered such evidence by arguing that this aggregate 
data may indicate that the arbitration agreements at issue were indeed 
much more one-sided than other agreements.124 
Although these studies do not delve into great detail about aggre-
gation policies, they suggest that courts are intertwining policy deci-
sions regarding class actions with these unconscionability analyses.  
The intermingling of substantive and procedural policy discussions by 
the courts is not necessarily undesirable.  Rather, perhaps it is scho-
lars’ dismay with this intermingling that should cause concern.  For 
instance, Broome writes, “The California courts presume that the pro-
cedural limitation will have substantive consequences.”125  Likewise, 
Professor Richard Nagareda argues that although “nominally cast in 
terms of unconscionability, the court’s analysis [in Discover Bank] ulti-
 
121 See id. at 61 (“[T]he same judicial hostility ostensibly thwarted eighty years ago 
continues today, albeit in a more subtle—but equally hostile—form.”).  
122 Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doc-
trine:  How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS 
BUS. L.J. 39, 44-48 (2006).  Broome’s research showed that “unconscionability chal-
lenges succeeded in about fifty-eight percent of cases in the arbitration context,” whe-
reas such challenges in the nonarbitration context “succeeded only eleven percent of 
the time.”  Id. at 47-48.  
123 Id. at 53 (quoting Hicks v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703, 714 (2004)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
124 See Bruhl, supra note 26, at 1457 (“The fact that arbitration agreements were 
more often held unconscionable may simply reflect the fact that during the relevant 
period they really were, on average, more unfair than other types of challenged agree-
ments . . . .”). 
125 Broome, supra note 122, at 57.  Some judges have also voiced skepticism about 
the effect of class action waivers on substantive rights.  See, e.g., Strand v. U.S. Bank 
Nat’l Ass’n N.D., 693 N.W.2d 918, 927 (N.D. 2005) (reasoning that these waivers are 
not unconscionable because the plaintiff “retains all substantive remedies he would 
otherwise have without the ‘no class action’ provision”).   
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mately speaks to the distortion that a foreclosure of aggregation might 
work . . . upon underlying substantive law.”126 
But, as I will explain in more detail in Part IV, this is exactly what 
state courts should be authorized to do.127  Because class action deci-
sions are often deeply rooted in substantive regulatory policies, nei-
ther the contract nor the FAA should limit a state in furthering its 
regulation of arbitration agreements in the small claims setting.  In 
Concepcion, the Court finally had the opportunity both to resolve the 
class action waiver debate and to provide a candid discussion about 
the practical effect that class actions have on substantive rights and 
liabilities.  The Court, however, failed to produce. 
III.  AT&T MOBILITY V. CONCEPCION :  THE FAA AND  
THE CALIFORNIA COURTS COLLIDE 
For the past decade, scholars have speculated as to how our na-
tion’s highest court would eventually resolve the class action waiver 
debate.128  The Court’s decision to intervene was a foregone conclu-
sion—after all, lower courts’ unconscionability rulings and their heavy 
reliance on the FAA’s savings clause seemed to deviate starkly from 
the Court’s liberal policy favoring arbitration.  But as one scholar had 
noted, the “pro-arbitration Supreme Court [found] itself in the posi-
tion of having picked most of the low-hanging anti-arbitration fruit.”129  
In Southland, for example, once the Court decided that the FAA 
should apply in state courts, its invalidation of the state legislature’s 
blatant attempt to flout the FAA was a fairly simple task.130  Judicial cir-
cumventions of the FAA, on the other hand, are harder to identify.  
Surely, the Court did not want to appear as if it was second-guessing 
state contract law principles.  This hesitation may explain why the 
 
126 Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents:  Class Settlement Pressure, 
Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1901 (2006). 
127 Certainly, there is a further question about the appropriate allocation of policy 
discussions between state courts and state legislatures.  However, state-level separations-
of-powers concerns are beyond the scope of this Comment. 
128 See, e.g., Bruhl, supra note 26, at 1464-88 (proposing several strategies that the 
Supreme Court could use were it to grant certiorari to a lower court’s unconscionability 
ruling); Wilson, supra note 48, at 791-92 (providing four hypothetical holdings for a 
case like Concepcion). 
129 Bruhl, supra note 26, at 1467. 
130 See id. (explaining that the Southland decision “involved relatively clear ques-
tions of federal law”). 
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Court, over the last decade, has rejected dozens of certiorari petitions 
challenging lower court unconscionability rulings.131 
Then along came the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Concepcion, and 
with it, an ideal set of facts for the Court to continue its predictable 
path in FAA cases.  This Part will briefly summarize the facts underly-
ing the Concepcion dispute and then discuss the Court’s views regard-
ing the enforceability of AT&T’s class action waiver.  As I will explain, 
the Court, in siding with AT&T—a company that prompts its custom-
ers to “rethink possible”132—first considered, and then severely li-
mited, the possibilities open to states that want to incorporate class 
proceedings into their regulatory policies. 
A.  Background of the Case 
The underlying dispute in Concepcion centers on a cellular phone 
contract between Vincent and Liza Concepcion and AT&T Mobility.  
The Concepcions purchased cell phone service from AT&T and re-
ceived two new cell phones as part of the agreement.133  Though the 
Concepcions did not have to pay for the phones themselves, AT&T 
charged them $30.22 in sales tax for the new devices.134  In response, 
the Concepcions brought a claim in the Southern District of Califor-
nia and asserted that AT&T’s advertisements for “free” phones were 
fraudulent.135  The case was later consolidated with a putative class ac-
tion against AT&T involving the same issues.136  AT&T then moved to 
compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement between the 
parties.137 
At its core, the arbitration agreement between the Concepcions 
and AT&T was similar to the agreements at issue in previous Califor-
nia cases, such as Szetela and Discover Bank.  The cell phone contract’s 
arbitration clause and class action waiver read as follows:  “You and 
AT&T agree that each may bring claims against the other only in your 
or its individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any 
 
131 See id. at 1466 (“Since 2000, there have been dozens of petitions . . . yet the 
court let them pass by . . . .”). 
132 The Network of Possibilities, AT&T, http://www.att.com/rethinkpossible (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2011). 
133 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011). 
134 Id.  
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 1744-45.   
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purported class or representative proceeding.”138  Unlike the first-
generation arbitration clause in Stolt-Nielsen, this agreement explicitly 
referenced class proceedings and could at first blush be referred to as 
a second-generation arbitration clause.139 
Yet the arbitration clause in Concepcion is more accurately categor-
ized as a third-generation arbitration clause, because it “attempt[s] to 
respond in various ways to the lower-court invalidations of second-
generation clauses.”140  What was this attempted response?  AT&T in-
cluded “consumer-friendly”141 provisions that supposedly altered the 
cost calculation for plaintiffs.  These additional provisions included, 
but were not limited to, a $7500 payment if the arbitration award ex-
ceeded the last written settlement offer AT&T made prior to selecting 
an arbitrator; cost-free arbitration for nonfrivolous claims; double at-
torneys’ fees if the arbitrator awarded the customer more than 
AT&T’s last settlement offer; and the option of conducting the arbi-
tration in person, over the phone, or solely on the filed papers.142 
Although AT&T claimed that the addition of “consumer-friendly” 
provisions would help consumers bring low-value claims to arbitra-
tion,143 the clauses were almost certainly a strategic move by AT&T to 
avoid state unconscionability rulings and to strengthen its position on 
appeal.  In fact, when AT&T’s codefendants petitioned for the Court 
to grant certiorari in T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Laster, a 2007 case involving 
a second-generation provision, AT&T filed an amicus brief requesting 
that the Court deny its codefendants’ petition.144  The amicus brief ex-
plained that AT&T had developed a new arbitration clause and that 
Laster was “a less than ideal vehicle for addressing whether States may 
refuse to enforce class waivers.”145  Thus, as one commentator has 
noted, AT&T’s long-term litigation strategy enabled it to return to the 
Court in 2010 with a “much less messy case” based on “the right set of 
facts.”146 
 
138 Brief for Respondents, supra note 89, at 3. 
139 See supra text accompanying note 80. 
140 Nagareda, supra note 50, at 1106. 
141 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 1 (quoting Makarowski v. AT&T Mobility, 
LLC, No. 09-1590, 2009 WL 1765661, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2009)). 
142 Id. at 5-7. 
143 Id. at 5. 
144 See Brief of AT&T Mobility LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party 
at 4-7, T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Laster, 553 U.S. 1064 (2008) (No. 07-976), 2008 WL 
534808, at *4-7. 
145 Id. at 21. 
146 Bruhl, supra note 61. 
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Both the district and circuit courts held that AT&T’s third-
generation class action waiver was unenforceable.  Although the dis-
trict court initially found that the provisions in the arbitration agree-
ment were an “adequate substitute” for consumers seeking class arbi-
tration, it ultimately concluded that it had to invalidate the waiver 
because of deterrence considerations.147  Applying the Discover Bank 
test, the district court reasoned that some putative class members 
might be unaware of any attempt to defraud consumers and that, 
without class proceedings, an adequate deterrent effect was lacking.148  
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.149  In particular, the Ninth Cir-
cuit analyzed whether the potential for a $7500 premium payment ac-
tually altered the cost equation for plaintiffs.150  On this issue, the 
court reasoned that “the maximum gain to a customer for the hassle 
of arbitrating a $30.22 dispute is still just $30.22.”151  Realistically, 
AT&T would simply pay the face value of a claim rather than proceed 
to arbitration and face the likelihood of a $7500 liability.152  The Ninth 
Circuit also concluded that preemption was not warranted because 
the Discover Bank rule was “simply a refinement of the unconscionabil-
ity analysis applicable to contracts generally in California.”153 
With this record in front of the Court, the Justices had several op-
tions.  For instance, the Court could have deferred to California’s de-
cision to incorporate the availability of class proceedings into its regu-
latory policy.  More generally, the Justices could have decided that this 
issue required them to wade too far into the intricacies of California’s 
contract law and its unconscionability doctrine.  Relying on federalism 
principles would presumably have been appealing to Justice Scalia.  
After all, it was he who wrote in a case involving a state’s choice-of-law 
rules that the Court should leave such rules to the states, given that 
there was “no compass to guide [the Court] beyond [its] own percep-
tions of what seems desirable.”154  But the Court balked at both of 
 
147 Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05-1167, 2008 WL 5216255, at *10-14 (S.D. 
Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 
2009), rev’d sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
148 Id. at *12-13. 
149 Laster, 584 F.3d at 852.  
150 Id. at 855-56. 
151 Id. at 856. 
152 Id.  
153 Id. at 857 (quoting Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 
987 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
154 Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1988). 
BLECHSCHMIDT FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2011  7:24 PM 
2012] All Alone in Arbitration 565 
these options and instead intruded on the states’ prerogative to for-
mulate class action policies. 
B.  The Concepcion Opinions 
Like other recent FAA cases, Concepcion was a 5-4 decision.155  Not 
surprisingly, the votes divided along traditional ideological lines, with 
the Justices volleying arguments about the FAA and the state’s role in 
shaping arbitration procedures. 
In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia frames his analysis by reiter-
ating the “fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of con-
tract.”156  He then discusses the Court’s historical interpretation of the 
savings clause, focusing specifically on Perry’s prohibition of discrimi-
natory applications of state contract defenses such as unconscionabili-
ty, and warning that “the act cannot be held to destroy itself.”157  With 
these standards in place, Scalia reasons that even if the Discover Bank 
rule applied to “any” contract—and not just arbitration agreements—
“the rule would have a disproportionate impact on arbitration agree-
ments.”158  As support, Justice Scalia references Broome’s article on 
unconscionability statistics in California, albeit with the disclaimer 
that the statistics are “not definitive.”159  Justice Scalia’s opinion also 
suggests that if the Court were to allow states to condition the enfor-
ceability of arbitration agreements on the availability of class proceed-
ings, then it would be obliged to allow states to demand other proce-
dures in arbitration, such as judicially monitored discovery.160 
After critiquing the Discover Bank rule, Justice Scalia moves to a 
discussion of class arbitration, picking up where Justice Alito left off in 
Stolt-Nielsen.  Here, Justice Scalia reiterates that the shift from individ-
ual to class proceedings introduces changes that are “fundamental,” 
including the introduction of absent parties, different procedures, 
and higher stakes.161  He then explains that class arbitration would 
 
155 Both Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010), and 14 Penn Pla-
za LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009), were 5-4 decisions. 
156 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (quoting Rent-
A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2276) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
157 Id. at 1748 (quoting AT&T v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 227-228 
(1998)). 
158 Id. at 1747. 
159 Id.  
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 1750 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 
1758, 1776 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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“greatly increase[] risks to defendants” and reasons that this risk will 
force defendants to accept “in terrorem” settlements of questionable 
claims.162  Finally, the majority opinion concludes with a brief discuss-
ion of the claim-disabling effect of class action waivers in the small 
claims setting.  But on this point, Justice Scalia gives short shrift to the 
Concepcions’ argument, stating that “[s]tates cannot require a proce-
dure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unre-
lated reasons.”163 
Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which he relies 
more closely on the text of the FAA than does Justice Scalia.  Accord-
ing to Justice Thomas, Congress’s use of the word “revocation” in the 
savings clause and its “conspicuous omission of ‘invalidation’ and 
‘nonenforcement,’” indicate that the savings clause carves out an ex-
ception for some, but not all, state contract defenses.164  Because the 
Discover Bank rule was more akin to a rule prohibiting contracts 
against public policy, and not one that dealt with the making of the 
arbitration agreement, Justice Thomas concludes that the savings 
clause does not protect that rule.165  Thus, under his interpretation, 
the Discover Bank rule warrants preemption. 
In dissent, Justice Breyer attacks several of Justice Scalia’s proposi-
tions.  On the facts, he asserts that the Discover Bank rule is not neces-
sarily discriminatory toward class action waivers and cites various cases 
in which courts have upheld class action waivers under California law, 
despite unconscionability challenges.166  On the FAA more generally, 
Justice Breyer also questions Justice Scalia’s assumption that a “fun-
damental attribute” of arbitration is its individualized, not class, na-
ture.167  Nothing in the FAA’s history, Justice Breyer contends, sup-
ports this conclusion.168 
Furthermore, Justice Breyer provides a defense of the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s view of the incentives to file suit in the small claims setting.  In-
voking Judge Richard Posner’s famous quote that “only a lunatic or a 
fanatic sues for $30,” Justice Breyer explains that class proceedings 
can provide countervailing advantages to the parties, particularly 
 
162 Id. at 1752. 
163 Id. at 1753. 
164 Id. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
165 Id. at 1756. 
166 Id. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing, e.g., Walnut Producers of Cal. v. Di-
amond Foods, Inc., 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 449, 459-62 (Ct. App. 2010)). 
167 Id. at 1759. 
168 Id.  
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plaintiffs.169  Justice Breyer, however, only briefly addresses the role of 
states in formulating aggregation policies by asking the majority, 
“[w]hy is this kind of decision—weighing the pros and cons of all class 
proceedings alike—not California’s to make?”170  Ultimately, with an 
uncharacteristic recitation of federalist principles, Justice Breyer con-
cludes that the majority has run afoul of the federalism goals con-
tained in the FAA’s savings clause.171 
C.  An Initial Critique of the Reasoning in Concepcion 
By and large, the initial response to Concepcion among policymak-
ers, media outlets, and the legal community was negative.  Several 
commentators, for example, lambasted the Court for its “devastating 
blow to consumer rights,” and Justice Scalia, in particular, for the “se-
lective nature of his brand of originalism.”172  In contrast, some com-
mentators welcomed the opinion, claiming that Concepcion was a step 
in the right direction in a world in which plaintiffs’ attorneys have ex-
ploited the claims of class members with injustices such as coupon set-
tlements.173  This Section will offer a brief critique of several of the 
opinion’s key points before explaining the larger doctrinal problems 
with the Court’s views of class actions in Part IV. 
The Court’s “Contract” Approach.  On the surface, the majority’s ap-
proach constitutes an emphatic promotion of contract autonomy.  In-
deed, the thrust of the Court’s class arbitration criticisms is based on 
the idea that the defendants would not have willingly agreed to arbi-
 
169 Id. at 1761 (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th 
Cir. 2004)). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 1762. 
172 Editorial, Gutting Class Action, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2011, at A26; see also Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Op-Ed., Supreme Court:  Class (Action) Dismissed, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2011, 
at A11, available at 2011 WLNR 9250480 (contending that, after Concepcion, it is “in-
creasingly a myth that an injured person can sue”).  
173 See, e.g., Lawrence W. Schonbrun, Supreme Court Ruling Is Not Bad News for Con-
sumers, the Class Action System Is the Real Culprit, HUFFPOST POLITICS (May 19, 2011, 2:42 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-w-schonbrun/supreme-court-ruling-is-
n_b_862491.html (“Consumers need real protection from nefarious corporate beha-
vior, not the class action runaround that only benefits the lawyers.”).  The term “cou-
pon settlement” refers to class action settlements that award class members worthless 
coupons, which are rarely redeemed, and that award class counsel generous attorneys’ 
fees.  For a discussion of the social legitimacy problems emerging from these settle-
ments and the resulting political pressures for Congress, see David Marcus, Response, 
Attorneys’ Fees and the Social Legitimacy of Class Actions, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 
157, 164-66 (2011), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/02-2011/Marcus.pdf. 
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trate if they knew they could be subject to the disadvantages of class 
proceedings.174  But contract autonomy is a two-way street.  Practically 
speaking, the Court’s enforcement of AT&T’s class action waiver can 
hardly be construed as promoting autonomy because, like most class 
action waivers, it was contained in a contract of adhesion.  In fact, in 
explaining the scope of the Discover Bank rule, Justice Scalia states that 
“the times in which consumer contracts were anything other than ad-
hesive are long past.”175  This concession is rather puzzling in light of 
the FAA’s contract-promoting goals.176  Furthermore, even if the au-
tonomy of both parties is enhanced, Concepcion steers the Court closer 
to its Lochner -era jurisprudence, in which the Court often prioritized 
economic liberty over sensible and socially desirable regulation.177  
Class actions can help further such regulation.  But after Concepcion, 
states have limited power to incorporate class proceedings into their 
regulatory structures. 
The Scope of the FAA’s Savings Clause.  There is no question that an 
overly expansive reading of the savings clause could threaten to “de-
stroy [the Act] itself.”178  The problem, though, is that the majority 
uses this admonition to justify its broad-sweeping and overinclusive 
FAA principles.  As one scholar explained before the Concepcion deci-
sion, a “remarkable aspect of the [Court’s FAA jurisprudence] is its 
formalism:  it does not matter why a state . . . singles out arbitration, 
just that it does so.”179  Perhaps the Court’s FAA approach could yield 
better results if it examined whether the state rule “rest[s] on general-
izations about arbitration’s inadequacy as a dispute resolution 
process.”180  Unfortunately, the current approach is more of an 
 
174 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752 (“We find it hard to believe that defendants 
would bet the company with no effective means of review . . . .”). 
175 Id. at 1750. 
176 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rhetoric Versus Reality in Arbitration Jurisprudence:  
How the Supreme Court Flaunts and Flunks Contracts 40 (George Wash. Univ. Legal Studies 
Research, Paper No. 547, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1809005 
(“[T]he Court [in Concepcion] commits contradictions that manifest a lack of under-
standing of contract law and even life.  Most strikingly:  on one page Justice Scalia ob-
serves that consumer contracts are totally ‘adhesive’ today yet on the very next page 
strikes the California law because the aggregate actions it ordains are not ‘consen-
sual.’” (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750-51)). 
177 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 620-
21 (3d ed. 2006). 
178 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (quoting AT&T v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 
214, 227-28 (1998)); see also supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
179 Aragaki, supra note 47, at 1248. 
180 Id. at 1297. 
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“on/off” switch181—the mere fact that the state rule can be interpreted 
as “singl[ing] out” arbitration is enough for the Court to preempt.182  
Concepcion exemplifies this approach.  Thus, in light of the Court’s in-
validation of the Discover Bank rule, it is now of seemingly no conse-
quence that a state, New Jersey in this instance, invalidated a class ac-
tion waiver on the same day it upheld another outside the small claims 
setting.183  Unfortunately, the Court completely disregarded whether 
the invalidation of the waiver may have been “desirable for unrelated 
reasons,”184 such as the avoidance of a class action waiver’s claim-
disabling effect. 
Fixing Problems in the Class Action System.  Admittedly, supporters of 
class action waivers like that in Concepcion correctly note that the class 
action system is far from perfect.185  “Entrepreneurial plaintiff’s attor-
ney[s]”186 have been criticized—perhaps justifiably—for their abuses of 
the system, including their attempts to maximize attorneys’ fees at the 
expense of the class.187  But is the Court’s enforcement of a class action 
waiver, which effectively strips consumers of an aggregate remedy, really 
a good solution to these problems?  Certainly not.  Legislative reform, 
such as Congress’s enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
(CAFA),188 can help cure some of class action’s ills.  Furthermore, scho-
lars have considered tweaks to the current fee regime that could per-
 
181 Id. at 1245. 
182 Id. at 1247.  
183 See supra note 111 and accompanying text (summarizing the New Jersey Su-
preme Court’s reasoning in these two cases). 
184 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
185 For example, class action reform could help enhance judicial economy and 
fairness to the litigants.  See Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to 
Eliminate Consumer Class Actions:  Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter–Spring 2004, at 75, 102 (“Academics as well as corporate 
interests have pointed to ethical and efficiency issues and have urged that class actions 
be limited or reformed, if not eliminated.”). 
186 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation:  Balancing Fairness 
and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879 (1987). 
187 See id. at 882-96 (detailing the divergent incentives that motivate plaintiffs’ at-
torneys and plaintiffs in class action litigation).  But see Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Fried-
man, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth:  The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Law-
yers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 103-05 (2006) (arguing, in opposition to Coffee, that class 
action opponents improperly focus on fairness considerations, such as whether “plain-
tiffs’ lawyers are being overcompensated,” instead of on the more important issue of 
whether class action litigation deters undesirable behavior by defendants). 
188 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006)).  CAFA 
expanded federal court jurisdiction over class actions, in part to reduce forum shopping 
and the effects of plaintiff-friendly state courts. 
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haps effectuate better results.189  While none of these reforms is fool-
proof, each is certainly a better way of handling problems within the 
class action system than removing the availability of class proceedings 
altogether. 
State Preferences for Other Procedures in Arbitration.  As noted earlier, 
the majority in Concepcion was concerned that if it allowed states to re-
quire the availability of class arbitration, then it would be obliged to al-
low states to require other procedures, such as judicially monitored dis-
covery.190  This is a fair point—one that the Concepcions had difficulty 
refuting.191  Nevertheless, discovery procedures do not exhibit the same 
claim-enabling effects as class actions.  Surely, the costs of discovery 
procedures influence the parties and, in extreme situations, can factor 
into a party’s decision to either go forward with or settle a claim.  But as 
the Discover Bank court recognized—and as I will explain in more detail 
in Part IV—class actions are “inextricably linked” to substantive regula-
tory policies.192  In some cases, this holds true from the policy’s incep-
tion.193  That the Concepcions could not distinguish how class proceed-
ings differ from procedures like judicially monitored discovery only 
underscores how important it is for the Court to provide a candid dis-
cussion about the practical effects of class proceedings. 
IV.  CLASS ACTION POLICY IN THE WAKE OF  
CONCEPCION AND SHADY GROVE 
Concepcion was indeed a crossroads for the class action.  Policies re-
lating to this form of aggregate proceeding had come a long way since 
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, which revolutionized the modern 
class action.194  But during the 2009 Term, the Court created some 
 
189 See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2043, 2047 (2010) (proposing that class action lawyers in small-stakes actions should 
receive one-hundred percent of the class’s recovery so as to “fully incentiviz[e] class action 
lawyers to bring as many cost-justified actions as possible”); see also Marcus, supra note 
173, at 163-66 (challenging Fitzpatrick’s utilitarian proposal and suggesting that it may 
overlook legitimacy benefits that emerge from a smaller attorney fee reward). 
190 See supra text accompanying note 160. 
191 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (question-
ing the Concepcions’ contention that cases involving other procedures would be a “far 
cry” from the instant case involving class arbitration). 
192 See supra text accompanying note 102. 
193 For an example, see infra text accompanying note 233. 
194 For a discussion of the 1966 amendments and their effects on class actions, see 
Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context:  A Prelimi-
nary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1484-89 (2008). 
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doctrinal confusion in two cases analyzing class proceedings.  In Shady 
Grove, the Court held that Rule 23 preempted a state’s attempt to limit 
aggregate remedies in court, and in so doing, wrote that class actions 
only have “incidental effect[s]” on substantive rights.195  Four weeks 
later, in Stolt-Nielsen, the Court seemed to change its view toward class 
actions—at least in the arbitration context—by holding that an arbi-
tration panel’s decision to allow aggregate remedies in arbitration 
would “fundamental[ly] change”  proceedings “to such a degree” that 
the consent of the two parties could not be presumed.196   
With Concepcion, another class arbitration case, on the docket last 
Term, the Court had the opportunity to resolve this confusion by ei-
ther distinguishing the two lines of reasoning or revisiting its flawed 
analysis in Shady Grove.  But the majority failed to seize the opportuni-
ty; instead, it blindly followed the language in Stolt-Nielsen and perhaps 
only added to the confusion by treating the rights of plaintiffs and de-
fendants differently within the same opinion.  This Part will discuss 
this troubling development within class action policy.  It will also offer 
a critique of one scholar’s attempt to reconcile these two lines of rea-
soning by showing that such a reconciliation requires a strained read-
ing of Stolt-Nielsen and a reliance on Shady Grove’s shortcomings.  Ulti-
mately, clarity from the Court is needed in order to explain the class 
action’s unique role as both a procedural mechanism and a vindicator 
of substantive rights. 
A.  Shady Grove and the “Incidental Effects” on Substantive Rights 
Lest there be confusion about the implications of a case like Shady 
Grove, it is important to begin by clarifying how these three cases dif-
fer.  Shady Grove did not involve the FAA; rather, it implicated a Rules 
Enabling Act (REA)197 challenge and is perhaps the most important 
decision addressing the Erie doctrine since Gasperini v. Center for Hu-
manities, Inc.198  In contrast, neither Concepcion nor Stolt-Nielsen involved 
an REA challenge, but instead considered the preemptive force of the 
 
195 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443 
(2010) (plurality opinion) (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 
(1946)). 
196 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775-76 (2010). 
197 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).  The REA provides that all state and federal laws “in con-
flict with” the “general rules of practice and procedure” in federal courts are void.  Id. 
198 518 U.S. 415 (1996).  In Gasperini, the Supreme Court held that the lower court 
should have applied New York’s standard governing excessive jury verdicts in a federal 
diversity case, as doing so would not have violated the Seventh Amendment.  Id. at 419. 
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FAA.  Nevertheless, the Court’s analysis in Shady Grove was the source 
of an important point of disagreement between the parties in Concep-
cion because of a single unifying fiber—the class action. 
Shady Grove involved a class action against Allstate Insurance in the 
Eastern District of New York for Allstate’s alleged failure to pay a sta-
tutory penalty on late benefits payments that were due to health care 
providers.199  The named plaintiff, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, 
claimed that it had received late payments for orthopedic services cov-
ered under one of Allstate’s auto insurance policies, but that it had 
not received a statutorily prescribed two percent monthly interest fee 
from the insurer.200  In response, Allstate pointed the court’s attention 
to section 901(b) of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules, which 
provided that “an action to recover a penalty . . . may not be main-
tained as a class action” unless the statute creating the penalty in-
cludes an express authorization.201  The New York insurance statute 
that prescribed the two percent fee included no such authorization.202 
Because this class action was a diversity suit in federal court, the 
New York court rule would not automatically resolve the issue unless 
the rule was considered substantive, rather than procedural, in nature.  
Thus, the Court was faced with the following Erie question:  whether, 
in a federal diversity suit, Rule 23 should supersede a state law that 
appeared to set policy on the availability of aggregate remedies.203  Al-
though section 901(b) seemed to be a calculated attempt by the New 
York legislature to limit the substantive liabilities of defendants in sta-
tutory penalty suits,204 its insertion into a collection of civil procedural 
rules no doubt muddled the issue. 
Intertwined with this question was an ancillary inquiry into the va-
lidity of Rule 23 itself.  In order for Rule 23 to be found valid under 
the REA, the rule would have to “really regulate[] procedure”205 and 
overcome the REA’s prohibition against rules that “abridge, enlarge 
 
199 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436-37. 
200 Id. at 1436. 
201 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2010). 
202 See N.Y. INS. LAW § 5106(a) (McKinney 2010). 
203 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436. 
204 See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 24, at 69-70 (“[T]his limitation on aggregate 
liability in New York ‘was the result of a compromise among competing interests’ that 
arose from concerns among prodefendant groups that the aggregation of penalties 
would lead to gross and destructive overenforcement.” (quoting Sperry v. Crompton 
Corp., 863 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (N.Y. 2007))). 
205 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1445 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 
(1941)). 
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or modify any substantive right.”206  Although the invalidation of Rule 
23—a rule that has allowed an enormous number of plaintiffs to bring 
collective actions in federal court—seems unfathomable, the argu-
ment for invalidation maintains some legitimacy.207  Previously, on the 
topic of class actions and substantive rights, Professor Stephen Bur-
bank has suggested that “[i]t is difficult to conclude, other than 
through a wooden analysis . . . that the advent of the small claims 
(negative value) class action did not ‘alter substantive law.’”208  Rule 23 
might still be valid, but the Court’s analysis would have to be sophisti-
cated enough both to preserve Rule 23 and still leave room for state 
class action policy decisions.  Instead, in Shady Grove, the Court served 
up a “wooden” analysis of Rule 23.209  Ultimately, a plurality of the 
Court concluded that, under a Hanna analysis, Rule 23 is valid and 
supersedes section 901(b) in federal court, leaving the defendant po-
tentially liable for the statutory penalties.210 
The most contentious portion of the plurality’s analysis explained 
that class proceedings are simply a matter of procedure, and nothing 
more: 
A class action, no less than traditional joinder (of which it is a species), 
merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at 
once, instead of in separate suits.  And like traditional joinder, it leaves the 
parties’ legal rights and duties intact and the rules of decision unchanged. 
. . . The likelihood that some (even many) plaintiffs will be induced to 
sue by the availability of a class action is just the sort of “incidental effec[t]” 
we have long held does not violate § 2072(b) [of the REA].
211
 
Yet this reasoning seems to be at odds with Stolt-Nielsen’s and Concep-
cion’s language about the fundamental changes that class proceedings 
introduce.  As Professor Richard Nagareda points out, “The formida-
 
206 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
207 See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 24, at 19 (describing the argument for Rule 
23’s invalidation as “increasingly compelling” but noting that “the disruptive conse-
quences of such a conclusion would be unacceptable”). 
208 Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch:  The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and 
Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1928 (2006) (quoting Nagareda, supra note 126, at 
1877). 
209 See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 24, at 41. 
210 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437-38, 1442-44.  The Court’s analysis followed that 
of Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470-74 (1965), which states that under a traditional 
Erie analysis, if there is an applicable federal rule on point and no substantial variation 
between the state and federal rule, then the court should apply the federal rule. 
211 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quot-
ing Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 455 (1946)). 
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ble claim-enabling effect of class treatment that the Shady Grove Court 
deems incidental in litigation becomes a fundamental difference in 
Stolt-Nielsen . . . .”212  Viewed together, these two cases exhibit a bit of 
doctrinal confusion regarding the correct treatment of aggregate pro-
ceedings and cannot be reconciled without ignoring the practical real-
ities of class proceedings. 
B.  Reconciling Shady Grove with the FAA Cases . . . or Not 
An analysis of the reasoning underlying these opposing views on 
aggregate proceedings illustrates why Concepcion is critically flawed.  Fa-
cially, the two lines of decisions do involve different mechanisms—class 
litigation on the one hand, which has been refined through countless 
iterations in the courts, and class arbitration on the other hand, which 
is far from a tested formula.  The doctrinal problems exceed this dis-
tinction, however, because the Court’s concern for the defendant’s in-
creased liability in Concepcion is simply absent from Shady Grove. 
In his attempt to resolve the cases’ apparent discrepancies, Profes-
sor Nagareda argues that the FAA’s international dimension should 
be viewed as the distinguishing factor.  He contends that class actions 
are a standard method of adjudicating domestic business disputes, and 
that for the Hanna analysis in Shady Grove, the effect of class actions 
can be treated as truly “incidental.”213  But in cases such as Stolt-Nielsen 
and others implicating the FAA, the international dimension of the 
FAA is overlooked.214  Because class actions are not nearly as common 
in the transnational setting as they are in the domestic setting, Profes-
sor Nagareda argues that imposing class arbitration would, in fact, be 
a “fundamental change” for many international parties.215  And, with-
 
212 Nagareda, supra note 50, at 1090; see also id. at 1074 (“Across the two cases, the 
Court maintains an almost studied avoidance of any explanation for the difference of 
view as to class treatment.”).  During the 2010 Term, Justice Scalia continued to sub-
scribe to his Shady Grove and Stolt-Nielsen views.  Compare Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 
1952 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reiterating his stance in Shady Grove that “the sole 
purpose of classwide adjudication is to aggregate claims that are individually viable” 
and that, as such, class actions do not alter the substantive rights of parties), with AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (invoking his reasoning in 
Stolt-Nielsen that “the shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action arbitration” leads to 
“changes” that are “fundamental,” and exploring these changes in greater depth 
(quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
213 Nagareda, supra note 50, at 1101-02. 
214 See id. at 1090-99 (arguing that international commerce disputes have informed 
the Court’s FAA jurisprudence).   
215 Id. at 1101-03.  
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out a relative degree of certainty in arbitration, international business 
could return to being a “legal no-man’s-land.”216  Finally, tying togeth-
er this explanation of the Concepcion dispute, he argues that because 
Shady Grove was correct vis-à-vis class action litigation, the lower courts 
in Concepcion were wrong in holding that the class action waiver in 
AT&T’s contract was unconscionable.217  In his view, this is especially 
true because AT&T’s waiver is not exculpatory.218 
While insightful, Professor Nagareda’s analysis misses the mark in 
a few key ways.  First, although his argument may shed some light on 
the differences between Shady Grove and the FAA cases, it deviates sub-
stantially from the actual language in Stolt-Nielsen to come up with a 
distinguishing factor.  Concerns for international relations, no doubt, 
play a role in some FAA cases.  With this in mind, the Court is argu-
ably fashioning federal common law in an appropriate manner.219  But 
this point should not fundamentally alter the aggregation analysis as 
Professor Nagareda argues it does.220 
Second, the plurality’s reasoning in Shady Grove, with which Naga-
reda agrees, is questionable to say the least.  As Professors Stephen 
Burbank and Tobias Wolff contend, the Court’s categorization of an 
aggregation mechanism’s “expansion of liability exposure [as] merely 
an ‘incidental effect’ does not describe reality, and we should not pre-
tend otherwise.”221  Such a categorization ignores the practical realities 
of Rule 23 and its monumental “impact on the regulation of econom-
ic and social activity.”222  This categorization, of course, fails to ac-
knowledge that under the modern formulation of the rule, negative-
value claims can be converted into headline-grabbing, bet-the-
company cases.223 
 
216 Id. at 1097-98.   
217 Id. at 1119-20. 
218 Id. at 1126.  
219 See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 36, at 358 (noting that some federal 
courts have properly treated prior FAA cases as subject to federal common law).  I say 
“arguably” because, as Carrington and Haagen point out, the federal common law of 
international relations generally does not involve matters of “slight political conse-
quence,” id., such as Stolt-Nielsen’s rule that class arbitration is a matter of consent.   
220 For a similar critique of Professor Nagareda’s inconsistent approach toward 
class proceedings in arbitration and in the courts, see Burbank, supra note 208, at 
1935-37. 
221 Burbank & Wolff, supra note 24, at 65.  
222 Id. at 25. 
223 See id. at 19 (“Certification can transform unenforceable negative-value claims 
into an industry-changing event . . . .”). 
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So if Shady Grove is wrong, does that mean that Concepcion was cor-
rect when it highlighted the increased risks to defendants in class arbi-
tration?  To a large extent, yes.  Surely those risks are real.  But what 
Concepcion failed to do was consider the flip-side of the equation—the 
risk of creating a claim-disabling effect through the removal of class 
proceedings.  Rather, with respect to the plaintiffs, the Court seemed to 
follow Shady Grove’s erroneous reasoning.224  In the same vein, by ignor-
ing the risk to plaintiffs, the Court failed to realize that states should be 
able to weigh the risks posed to both plaintiffs and defendants. 
An extrapolation of the arguments in Professors Burbank and 
Wolff’s critique of the Shady Grove decision helps synthesize these ar-
guments.  Both section 901(b) of the New York Civil Practice Law and 
Rules in Shady Grove and the California statute that enabled the un-
conscionability rule in Discover Bank attempted to set liability policy.  
In both cases, the availability or nonavailability of the class action de-
vice was the determining factor in the regulatory decision.  Therefore, 
the class action is not simply a procedural mechanism with an “inci-
dental effect” but rather a deeply rooted means for advancing regula-
tory choices.  States certainly may come to different conclusions on a 
waiver’s unconscionability depending on the individual’s incentives to 
file suit, as is evidenced by New Jersey’s unconscionability analyses.225  
Congress could also enact its own liability policies that would trump 
the state’s regulatory decisions.  But viewed in isolation, the state’s de-
cision should not be preempted by a federal statute, like the FAA, that 
does not endeavor to affect liability policies.226 
Several lower courts have adopted this line of reasoning.  As noted 
earlier, the California Supreme Court in Discover Bank proclaimed that 
“class actions . . . are . . . inextricably linked to the vindication of sub-
stantive rights.”227  The Maryland Court of Appeals has similarly noted 
 
224 In its brief, AT&T claimed that if the availability of a class action under Rule 23 
did not alter the defendant’s aggregate liability in Shady Grove, then the Court could 
not deem the class action waiver “exculpatory” because the withholding of class pro-
ceedings would not change a defendant’s liability.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, 
at 44-45.  Although the Court in Concepcion never actually cited Shady Grove, it effective-
ly came to the same conclusion when it ignored the ruling’s effect on future plaintiffs. 
225 See supra text accompanying note 111. 
226 Concededly, the Southland decision did interpret the FAA as “creat[ing] a body 
of federal substantive law” for issues of arbitrability.  Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 
U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 
U.S. 1, 24 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  However, this does not equate 
to a congressional intent to affect the liability of wireless phone companies.  
227 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1109 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
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that rather than being a mere matter of procedure, the class action 
has a “penumbral remedial aspect” because of its claim-enabling ef-
fect.228  While Justice Breyer’s recognition of the state’s role in weigh-
ing the pros and cons of class proceedings is a good first step, the 
Court should come to appreciate this “penumbral remedial aspect” in 
future class action cases rather than rely on the sort of flawed reason-
ing found in Shady Grove.  Otherwise, the Court will fail to acknowl-
edge the practical realities of class action waivers.  Without class ac-
tions, the concern is not simply that plaintiffs will be alone in 
arbitration (the title of this Comment is, indeed, somewhat of a mis-
nomer).  Instead, the likely consequence of removing class proceed-
ings is that plaintiffs will either have no incentive to go to arbitration, 
or they may not even know that their rights have been infringed at all. 
V.  FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AND THE PATH TO REFORM 
With Concepcion now in the rearview mirror, commentators have 
speculated as to whether the entire class action system as we know it 
will soon be behind us as well.229  To some extent, this is true; the fre-
quency of class arbitrations will almost assuredly decrease.  Fortunate-
ly, though, post-Concepcion developments suggest that class action liti-
gation will not be flatlining anytime soon.  In the months following 
the release of the Concepcion opinion, lower courts have found various 
ways to distinguish the case, based both on the unique facts of AT&T’s 
class action waiver and the unresolved questions stemming from the 
opinion.230  Moreover, reform efforts have commenced, with Congress 
already considering a bill that would amend the FAA and with admin-
 
228 Gilman v. Wheat, First Sec., Inc., 692 A.2d 454, 464 (Md. 1997).  The court ex-
plained that this “penumbral remedial aspect” of class actions helps overcome “proce-
dural or economic impediments that might hinder a normal action [and] make relief 
that otherwise might be only potentially available to a plaintiff actually available.”  Id. 
229 See, e.g., Ashby Jones, After AT&T Ruling, Should We Say Goodbye to Consumer Class 
Actions?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Apr. 27, 2011, 12:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/ 
04/27/after-att-ruling-should-we-say-goodbye-to-consumer-class-actions (noting Professor 
Brian Fitzpatrick’s prediction that a victory for AT&T could lead to “the end of class ac-
tion litigation”). 
230 Although this section focuses on how courts have distinguished Concepcion, 
some courts have faithfully followed the opinion.  See, e.g., Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, 
LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the FAA preempts a Florida 
law requiring class-wide proceedings in arbitration); see also Arellano v. T-Mobile USA, 
Inc., No. 10-5663, 2011 WL 1842712, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2011) (following Concep-
cion but noting that the Concepcion opinion had “regrettably” rejected the plaintiff’s 
argument that individual arbitration made it cost prohibitive for a single plaintiff to 
bring suit). 
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istrative agencies considering additional remedies.  This Part will be-
gin by briefly analyzing the post-Concepcion landscape.  It will then ex-
plain that, though efforts to change Concepcion’s effect at the legisla-
tive and administrative level are a step in the right direction, tweaks in 
the judicial treatment of the class action device could provide imme-
diate protection both for consumers and for states that want to factor 
aggregation policies into their regulatory regimes. 
A.  The Evolving Scope of the Concepcion Opinion 
The first noteworthy development regarding Concepcion’s scope 
concerns its interaction with the “statutory rights analysis” used by 
some lower courts.  As Part II mentioned, some courts that invalidated 
class action waivers over the past decade used a “statutory rights analy-
sis” rather than the doctrine of unconscionability.231  Using this analy-
sis, courts have invalidated class action waivers where the foreseeable 
result is that plaintiffs will be unable to vindicate their statutory rights 
in arbitration. 
The analysis seems particularly applicable in situations where 
Congress has embedded procedural devices, such as the class action, 
into a statute to further public policy goals.232  For example, when 
Congress amended the Civil Rights Act in 1991, it expanded the sta-
tute’s damages provisions, and in doing so, provided plaintiffs with an 
incentive to bring class claims.233  Furthermore, statistics since 1991 
show that the number of employment discrimination class actions 
have increased as a result of the amendments, thus improving private 
enforcement of the federal statute.234  Therefore, a waiver of class pro-
ceedings for a civil rights claim, for instance, would seem to be at odds 
with the statutory structure. 
To date, the statutory rights analysis has been used to circumvent 
both Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion.  Prior to Stolt-Nielsen, the Second Cir-
cuit invalidated a class action waiver in an antitrust case against Ameri-
can Express because the retention of multiple expert witnesses—which 
is par for the course in antitrust cases—was prohibitively expensive for 
 
231 See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text. 
232 See Marcus, supra note 173, at 162 (“Governments regularly use procedural de-
vices to fine-tune the regulatory force of the substantive law.”). 
233 Civil Rights Act of 1991, sec. 102, § 1977A, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-74 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. 1981a (2006)); see also Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of 
Workplace Reform, 49 B.C. L. REV. 367, 367 (2008) (explaining that the Act expanded 
compensatory and punitive damage relief). 
234 Id. at 367, 374-75. 
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individual plaintiffs and would have effectively stripped the plaintiffs of 
their statutory rights.235  The Supreme Court subsequently vacated and 
remanded this decision in light of Stolt-Nielsen.236  On reconsideration, 
however, the Second Circuit reaffirmed its previous ruling, concluding 
that the Court’s contract approach in Stolt-Nielsen did not control its 
fact-specific approach centered on the plaintiffs’ statutory rights.237  
The Second Circuit also found support in earlier FAA cases for its con-
clusion that a statutory rights analysis can be invoked, notwithstanding 
the Court’s liberal policy favoring arbitration.238  Although the Second 
Circuit conceded that Stolt-Nielsen prevented it from ordering class arbi-
tration, it ruled that Stolt-Nielsen did not prevent class action litigation 
from moving forward.239  Notably, the Southern District of New York, in 
accordance with this opinion—and apparently sticking its tongue out 
toward Washington, D.C.—invalidated a class action waiver the day after 
the Supreme Court released Concepcion.240 
If circuit courts continue to follow a statutory rights analysis, then 
the Supreme Court will likely grant certiorari at some point to clarify 
whether this line of reasoning can act as an exception to the standard 
FAA rule favoring arbitration.  As an initial matter, the extent to which 
these cases can circumvent Concepcion is not entirely clear.  Given that 
a lawsuit must involve a right protected by federal statute, the statutory 
rights analysis is narrower than unconscionability rules like Discover 
Bank’s.  But what is clear is that the statutory rights analysis provides 
an example of how the Court could consider the class action’s role 
within substantive law.  To her credit, Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent 
in Stolt-Nielsen, intimates that she would take this approach.  She notes 
that “class proceedings may be ‘the thing’” in the small claims context 
because “without them, potential claimants will have little, if any, in-
centive to seek vindication of their rights.”241  But whether she can 
 
235 In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 315-20 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated 
sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010). 
236 Am. Express Co., 130 S. Ct. at 2401. 
237 See In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 193-94, 199 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(highlighting the narrow reach of Stolt-Nielsen and stressing that “each case which 
presents a question of the enforceability of a class action waiver . . . must be considered 
on its own merits”). 
238 Id. at 197 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). 
239 Id. at 200. 
240 See Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 394, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (invalidating a class action waiver without a single reference to Concepcion).   
241 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1783 (2010) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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persuade four Justices to join her will certainly be difficult considering 
the Court’s recent track record in FAA cases. 
A second development regarding Concepcion’s scope—one that is 
much narrower than the first but similar in that it involves a federal sta-
tute that may conflict with the Court’s interpretation of the FAA—
concerns whether the decision conflicts with certain contracts governed 
by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).242  Just a few months be-
fore Concepcion was released, an administrative law judge for the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board concluded that a class action waiver in an 
employer’s arbitration agreement violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(4) 
of the NLRA because employees could have reasonably believed that 
they were precluded from filing charges with the Board.243  Following 
Concepcion, the full Board invited interested parties to submit amicus 
briefs explaining whether the Board should enforce the waiver.244  Ad-
mittedly, the Board’s decision will be limited to employment contracts 
under the NLRA, and employers could presumably cure this problem 
simply by being more explicit about their workers’ rights in future con-
tracts.  Nevertheless, this case may prove significant, as the Board might 
temporarily be able to sidestep Concepcion in the NLRA context. 
A third development regarding Concepcion concerns whether lower 
courts might take the old-fashioned route and distinguish Concepcion 
on its facts.  One interpretation of the case is that it only singles out 
state rules that make class action waivers “per se unenforceable.”245  
Such a reading does not mean that all class action waivers are “per se 
enforceable.”246  Within this gap, unconscionability challenges could 
presumably continue.247  Indeed, despite Concepcion, one Northern 
District of California judge has taken this approach, ruling that Cali-
fornia unconscionability law can still be used to invalidate an employ-
 
242 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006). 
243 D.R. Horton, Inc., No. 12-CA-25764, 2011 NLRB LEXIS 1, at *11-14 ( Jan. 3, 
2011).  Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(4) of the NLRA make it an unfair labor practice to 
interfere with employees’ statutory rights under section 7 or to discriminate against 
those who file charges with the Board.  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(4) (2006).  
244 Notice and Invitation to File Briefs, D.R. Horton, Inc., No. 12-CA-25764, 2011 
NLRB LEXIS 307, at *1 ( June 16, 2011). 
245 John Murray, Jr., The Supreme Court’s Decision on Unconscionability, the Purpose of 
the Federal Arbitration Act, and Banning Class Arbitration:  Dr. John E. Murray, Jr. on AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, May 18, 2011, 
available at LEXIS, 2011 EMERGING ISSUES 5659 (italics omitted). 
246 Id. (italics omitted). 
247 See id. (noting that the AT&T contract has “created a new model draft of arbi-
tration clauses in such consumer contracts”). 
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er’s class action waiver.248  In addition, a New Jersey appellate court re-
cently invalidated a class action waiver that it found to be “too confus-
ing, too vague, and too inconsistent to be enforced,” despite its con-
clusion that Concepcion controlled.249 
In the same vein, while AT&T’s “consumer-friendly” provisions 
perhaps provided an ideal vehicle through which the Court could fur-
ther its FAA policies,250 their uniqueness also makes the case easily dis-
tinguishable.  For instance, if the agreement is merely a second-
generation clause that lacks additional provisions, then a court could 
perhaps distinguish Concepcion on its unique facts.  Albeit a welcome 
development for consumers, this approach would unfortunately do 
little to clarify current problems with class action policy. 
Finally, a fourth development regarding Concepcion’s scope in-
volves its effect, or lack thereof, on suits brought under state private 
attorney general statutes.  In the months after Concepcion, a California 
appellate court considered whether to enforce a waiver in an employ-
er’s arbitration agreement that prohibited suits by employees under 
the California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA).251  Spe-
cifically, the PAGA allows employees to bring representative actions 
against their employers for violations of the state’s Labor Code.252  
These actions are not class actions and are thus not subject to the 
same requirements, such as certification or notice requirements.253  
These suits, however, can have some of the same deterrence effects of 
class actions.254  Ultimately, the court held that the waiver of PAGA 
suits was unenforceable and that FAA preemption would effectively 
nullify the benefits of these actions to the public.255  The court also dis-
tinguished Concepcion quite gracefully by noting that a representative 
 
248 See Kanbar v. O’Melveny & Myers, No. 11-0892, 2011 WL 2940690, at *6-7, *12-
13 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2011) (concluding that the waiver was unconscionable but grant-
ing the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration because the plaintiff had waived this 
argument). 
249 NAACP of Camden Cnty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 2011 WL 3273896, at *1 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 2, 2011). 
250 See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text. 
251 CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698–2699.5 (West 2011); see also Brown v. Ralphs Grocery 
Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 856 n.1 (Ct. App. 2011). 
252 CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a). 
253 Brown, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862-63. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. at 863-65. 
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action in arbitration would not have the same attributes as class arbi-
tration, which so concerned the majority in Concepcion.256 
While a discussion of the pros and cons of these private attorney 
general statutes, such as “day in court” considerations, is beyond the 
scope of this Comment, this fourth development underscores that 
Concepcion has not completely eliminated the deterrence effect of 
court proceedings.  Some wrongdoing will still be held in check, even 
without the class action.  Nevertheless, barring a significant upswing in 
the enactment and usage of these types of statutes, other reform ef-
forts are needed to cure the problems resulting from Concepcion. 
B.  Reform Efforts 
Thus far, this Comment has advocated reform efforts solely at the 
judicial level, and in particular, for a change in the way the Court views 
the class action mechanism in FAA cases.  A more flexible approach to 
the FAA, rather than the Court’s current rigid approach, would enable 
the Court to appreciate the role that class actions play in substantive 
law.257  Such a reform does have its disadvantages, however.  For exam-
ple, a case-by-case approach that analyzes how the class action device 
either fits into a state’s unconscionability paradigm or into a federal 
statutory scheme does require a greater share of courts’ time and re-
sources.  Furthermore, there is not always a clear line distinguishing 
claims that are prohibitively expensive from those that are economical-
ly viable.  Even so, a more flexible approach to the FAA would certainly 
yield better outcomes than the Court’s current approach, which effec-
tively prohibits plaintiffs from vindicating substantive rights. 
There are, however, steps at both the legislative and administrative 
levels that could be taken to facilitate a new approach at the judicial 
level.  Most prominently, after Concepcion was handed down, a group 
of lawmakers reintroduced a bill in Congress that would amend the 
FAA.  The bill, the Arbitration Fairness Act, was originally proposed in 
 
256 Id. at 863. 
257 Other scholars have also advocated a more flexible approach to the FAA, al-
though one that does not necessarily account for the current problems regarding class 
action policy.  See Aragaki, supra note 47, at 1283 (proposing a functional test for de-
termining when state law singles out arbitration); Diana M. Link & Richard A. Bales, 
Waiving Rights Goodbye:  Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements After Stolt-Nielsen v. 
AnimalFeeds International, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 275, 276 (2011) (advocating a 
“totality of the circumstances” approach); Wilson, supra note 48, at 792 (concluding 
that states should be permitted to invalidate waivers based on unconscionability prin-
ciples as long as those principles are “applied in an objectively reasonable manner”). 
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2009258 and excludes employment contracts and consumer agreements 
from the FAA’s scope.259  As I noted earlier, commentators have la-
beled it as an attempt to restore Congress’s original intent of only ap-
plying the FAA to parties with relatively equal bargaining power.260  
The bill, however, will undoubtedly face intense lobbying attacks, and 
it has been criticized as taking a “meat cleaver . . . to an issue that re-
quires a scalpel” because not all employees, consumers, and franchi-
sees are unsophisticated bargainers.261  Nevertheless, the introduction 
of the bill is a welcome development to those who are dismayed by the 
Court’s current FAA jurisprudence. 
Also at the legislative level, it will be interesting to see whether states 
begin enacting more private attorney general statutes like California’s 
PAGA statute.  State lawmakers who want to increase deterrence efforts 
aimed at harmful business practices should consider enacting these sta-
tutes because presumably they would have a greater chance of with-
standing an FAA preemption challenge.262  Additionally, even suppor-
ters of limited government intervention may react favorably to this 
method of reform because it would leave the enforcement of substan-
tive law up to the courts, rather than politicized public agencies.263 
Finally, at the administrative level, the recently established Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is in a position to help 
guarantee the availability of class remedies through future regulations.  
However, the CFPB, which emerged as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,264 is only beginning to 
take shape, and Republican lawmakers have adamantly opposed the 
Bureau’s organizational plans.265  Thus, a considerable amount of time 
 
258 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009).  
259 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011). 
260 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
261 See Aragaki, supra note 47, at 1273 (quoting Peter B. Rutledge, The Case Against 
the Arbitration Fairness Act, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2009, at 4, 7) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
262 See supra notes 251-56 and accompanying text. 
263 Cf. Burbank, supra note 208, at 1931 (noting that private enforcement actions, 
such as class actions, can be “critically important to the vindication of substantive law 
norms in a society that distrusts, and is therefore unwilling to commit adequate re-
sources to, centralized government enforcement”). 
264 § 1011(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 5491(a) (West Supp. 2011).  
265 Republicans have opposed plans proposed by the CFPB chief architect, Elizabeth 
Warren, and are expected to block President Obama’s appointee for the CFPB director 
position, Richard Cordray.  Tamara Keith, New Consumer Protection Agency Faces Opposition, 
NPR ( July 21, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/21/138550502/new-consumer-
protection-agency-faces-opposition.  At the time of writing, Cordray had been approved 
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may pass before the agency implements any reform efforts.266  But 
aside from these obstacles, once the CPFB is up and running, it 
should immediately consider reforming the use of class action waivers 
to help cure the injustices the Concepcion opinion created. 
CONCLUSION 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion was a crossroads for the future of 
class action policy, the protection of consumer rights, and the use of 
class arbitration as a technique for dispute resolution.  This Comment 
has demonstrated why an appreciation for the “penumbral remedial 
aspect”267 of the class action and for states’ roles in formulating aggre-
gation policy should have been factored into the Court’s analysis.  
While subsequent developments may limit or reform Concepcion’s 
scope, the Court should nevertheless reconsider its views on class ac-
tion policy in future cases. 
 
 
by the Senate Banking Committee but not by an entire Senate vote.  Bobby Caina Cal-
van, Brown Endorses Cordray to Head New Consumer Watchdog Agency, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 
15, 2011, at A18, available at 2011 WLNR 23592188.    
266 See Nathan Koppel, Will Federal Consumer Bureau Ride to the Rescue of Class Actions?, 
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Apr. 29, 2011, 6:03 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/04/ 
29/will-federal-consumer-bureau-ride-to-the-rescue-of-class-actions (noting that reform 
from the CFPB could take years). 
267 Gilman v. Wheat, First Sec., Inc., 692 A.2d 454, 464 (Md. 1997).   
